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ABSTRACT 
The framing of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) over a period of ten 
years is a project on a unique scale and with a unique significance. According to Robert 
Devlin, the FTAA is undoubtedly the most ambitious collective economic initiative in the 
history of the Western Hemisphere. The intention is to create the biggest market in the world, 
comprising 800 million people and a GDP of US$11 - 14 trillion.  If it is successful, it will 
also bring to conclusion ten years of negotiation and bilateral and sub-regional trade 
agreements that will be essentially subsumed in the FTAA. However, prospects for finalising 
the Agreement look slim as negotiations on the scope and scale of the FTAA have reached an 
impasse when the January 2005 deadline passed without consensus. The failure to complete 
the Agreement raises significant questions about the raison d’etre of regional agreements, the 
relationship between globalisation and regionalism, and the balance between free trade and 
social interests.  
The debate surrounding the FTAA presents a particularly interesting illustration of 
the arguments for and against free trade agreements generally -- first, for their historic place 
in the global pattern and context of regionalisation within the Americas; second, for the issues 
raised by the current impasse.  
This paper explores the inherent flaws in the FTAA and how it might have potentially 
negative impacts on the region in terms of social, economic, environmental and political 
outcomes. The first part of this paper looks at the global and regional context of the FTAA 
and the growth of regionalism, mediated by the US and the EU. The second part look s at how 
regionalism and free trade, working through the FTAA, are seen to have serious drawbacks, 
which have generated a range of opposition, and led to the frustration of negotiations.   
This paper also questions whether, given the experience of NAFTA (North American 
Free Trade Area), the model itself is flawed; and whether the FTAA, in its far wider scope 
and significance for the Americas, will in effect fuel a ‘race to the bottom’. The final question 
is whether the situation can be retrieved, and whether changes to the FTAA, enabling it to 
promote economic, social and human development, will in fact be put in place.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The failure of FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) to deliver sustainable growth has grown in 
parallel with the spread of globalisation. Opponents of FTAs condemn them for ‘fuelling a 
race to the bottom’, as they pitch poor countries against one other to produce favourable 
economic conditions for foreign investment, often at a high political, social, and 
environmental cost .  
 
In January 2005, the debate over the costs and merits of the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the 
Americas) took on a new edge, with the failure of negotiating parties to reach agreement. The 
year 2005 has seen not consensus, but polarisation. Currently, the FTAA has reached a 
deadlock, which can only be broken if Brazil agrees to subordinate its interests in relation to 
the US.    
 
From the streets of Seattle to the stradas of Sao Paolo, opponents have challenged the FTAA 
and what it signifies. At the heart of the opposition is the claim of civil and democratic 
lobbies throughout the Americas that the FTAA will reproduce the disabilities of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which, by transferring power to corporate 
interests, has frustrated democratic governance and autonomy, notably in Mexico.  
 
Much present criticism of the FTAA focuses on Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement of 
1994, which allows foreign investors to sue governments and demand compensation for any 
governmental act, including public interest laws that diminish the value of an investment. In 
the words of Hoebing et al., this “unprecedented power granted to corporations restricts the 
ability of governments to protect the environment, public welfare, and to ensure that foreign 
investments support social, economic and environmental goals.”1 Essentially, the mechanism 
for resolving investor-state disputes sets big business against governments that are often 
unable to withstand legal challenge. Governments stand to lose sovereign control as 
governance is determined by vested interests. To date, US corporations have launched 28 
lawsuits in Canada and Mexico, claiming damages of US$38 billion, which strike at the heart 
of national sovereignty, especially in respect of laws protecting the environment and public 
health. 2   
 
The fact that the FTAA is modelled on NAFTA has set in place a continuing battle. Going far 
beyond NAFTA, the FTAA offers the whole of Latin America the opportunity for 
unrestricted free trade. However, civil and democratic organisations throughout the Americas 
have protested strongly, saying that the planned liberalisation of trade goes too far, and fails 
to consider the social, political, environmental and economic impact. The corporate business 
lobby (and particularly Brazilian business) also argues that the Agreement as proposed is 
fundamentally flawed, because it is not ‘free’ trade at all, as the US wants to establish markets 
abroad while protecting economic interests at home.  Significantly, interests cross national 
boundaries. Corporate interest is identical, whether in North or South America.  
 
The structural tensions inherent in this challenge cannot be avoided even if agreement on the 
FTAA is reached. On the one hand, given the ferocity of globalisation, some sort of 
hemispheric FTA in the Americas is inevitable. But, to address, let alone to meet the concerns 
of civil society for social and economic justice may undermine the competitive edge that the 
FTA has promised to deliver. Therefore for reasons of maximizing competitiveness, civil 
                                              
1 San Sebastian, M and Hurtig, A, ‘Moving on from NAFTA to the FTAA?: The Impact of Trade 
Agreements on Social and Public Health Conditions in the Americas’, Revista Pan Americana de Salud 
Publica/Pan America Public Heath Review , 16 (4), (2004), 273. 
2 Hoebing, J, Weintraub, S and Delal Baer M, (eds) NAFTA and Sovereignty: Trade-Offs for Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States , (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1996. 
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society’s concerns have not been incorporated into the negotiations, whereas big business, 
with its ability to influence national politics, has.  
 
The conflict over the FTAA, and what it represents and can deliver, and the failure to 
incorporate a social plan, are the latest and most acute moments in the historic debate about 
the consequences of unrestrained free trade agreements which, by definition, have excluded 
or limited a regulatory social agenda. In this context, the EU represents a more progressive 
and successful model, which has promoted the interdependence of social and economic 
growth.  
 
This paper argues that the present model for the FTAA is flawed. By focusing upon short 
term economic profit rather than long term investment, it is narrow minded and undermines 
chances for increasing competitiveness in the region. Not only does the Agreement threaten 
the economical, political, social and environmental landscape, it could also limit the 
hemisphere’s long term potential and restrain its development and therefore be directly 
counter-productive to aspirations for a progressive agenda in the Americas.  
 
THE MAKING OF THE FTAA 
 
The Impact of Globalisation: Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation  
 
Since the end of the Second World War, globalisation has encouraged the formation of 
competitive regional blocs to foster internal and external trade. The expansion of investment 
provides new opportunities for social and economic change in developing regions such as 
Latin America, but only if this is accompanied by conditions that ensure equitable, stable and 
sustainable growth, social cohesion, and development.  
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a proliferation in the number of regional integration 
agreements throughout the world, and in the renewal and strengthening of others. This 
process is taking place against a new global dynamic, and within a new and expanding 
agenda. This agenda challenges an unrestrained market and puts forward ambitious aims to 
assert democratic control. As Jean Grugel suggests, there are three kinds of region building 
initiatives: integration through trade liberalisation; regional governance; and regionalism as 
citizenship. Onto the trade agenda, within the so-called ‘new regionalism’, have been grafted 
‘questions of democracy, accountability, participation, transparency, security and social 
policy’. This has brought with it a new set of social and political actors.3 
 
The questions remain, who owns this agenda, how significant is it, and how effectively can it 
be pursued? To what extent can new actors, whether civil society or political groups, move 
beyond a mere presence, to having a real influence? To date, their influence has been 
extremely limited within NAFTA.  However, despite the risks, governments across the globe 
have remained committed to regional integration in the belief that its benefits outweigh the 
risks. Economically, it has been thought that trade liberalisation will lead to greater flows of 
commerce and investment, which will in turn create jobs, reduce poverty, raise the quality of 
life, and promote more balanced economic development. Politically, governments have 
favoured integration in order to promote regional security and stability.  
 
Regionalism in the Americas 
 
For Latin America, economic regionalism is supposed to bring larger domestic markets, 
greater competition, better bargaining power and an ability to exploit complementarities. 
                                              
3 Grugel, J, ‘Civil Society and Inclusion in New Regionalism: Can Civil Society Influence a Trade-led 
Agenda?’ (Paper prepared for the Second Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Trade Network, 
Florence, 2002). 
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However, the benefits of regionalism have not met expectations, and inequalities continue to 
rise.  
 
Despite the formation of sub-regional blocs, the pace and direction of regionalism in Latin 
America has been set by the US. While this in part reflects the pressure from the EU -- which 
has seen its membership rise from 15 to 25 over 10 years, and is seen as a competitor for 
market space -- it also reflects a historic territoriality, established by the Monroe Doctrine in 
1823, that the US has ever since exercised over its southern neighbours.  
 
Indeed, since the coming into force of NAFTA, the US has been developing bilateral FTAs 
and RTAs (Regional Trade Agreements) in order to make the prospect of the FTAA more 
acceptable. However, it was not until Latin America emerged from the economic depression 
of the early 1980s, and adopted fiscal discipline, trade liberalisation, deregulation and other 
policies that would later be defined as the ‘Washington Consensus’, that the US regarded 
Latin America as a potential market.4 Unlike the traditional regional imperative, which was 
characterised by closed and protectionist trading blocs as a way of managing economic 
policy, new regional trends reflects greater interdependence between states and the global 
trend away from protectionism. New associations have been created as a means of increasing 
competitiveness.  
 
Regionalism within the Americas has also been driven by the demands of the North American 
economy. NAFTA illustrated the growing desire of the US to enter into formal free trade 
agreements with Canada and Mexico to gain economic leverage against the emerging 
influence and impact of MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) in South America. 
The coming of NAFTA revealed a global reality – the growing trend of regionalism as a 
means to guarantee markets. Thus, NAFTA was signed against the backdrop of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which brought a single currency to the EU. 
 
Competition for market space led the way for the US to begin negotiations on a number of 
other agreement s, such as the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which was 
signed on 28 May 2004 and approved by the Congress on 28 July 2005. The Central 
American countries were added to the list of nine other countries, including Israel, Chile and 
Jordan, with which the US has signed FTAs. 
But the US is no longer the sole potential partner. Aware of the economic and political issues, 
and not wanting to be excluded from Latin America, the EU has also established, or is in the 
process of establishing, three FTAs in Latin America (Chile, Mexico, and MERCOSUR), and 
pressure is mounting on Latin America to establish stronger links with Asia.  
 
Although regional agreements may differ in shape and content, what they have in common is 
that they serve the loudest voices – and those domestic lobbies that have the most to gain. 
Therefore, what we define broadly as a free trade agreement may, in fact, be something much 
more focused, as domestic groups try to protect themselves against negative consequences. 
 
THE EUROPEAN MODEL 
 
While regional trading blocs have been growing in Latin America, the EU has been 
developing different models, in which specific relationships with Latin and Central America 
form an explicit part.   
 
A FTA linking countries in Latin America is of great concern to the EU. With a population of 
220 million and a GDP of US$1100 billion, making it the fourth largest economic power in 
the world -- after the EU, NAFTA and Japan -- Latin America is of immense interest to the 
                                              
4 Williamson, J ‘What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?’ World Bank 
Research Observer, 15, (2), (August 2000), 251-264. 
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EU. Indeed, a major objective of the EU in recent years has been to prise open the potential of 
the region by means of bilateral, gradual and reciprocal trade liberalisation.  
 
However, that these debates have taken place is a commentary on the judgement that the EU 
is a political lightweight in the field of international relations, and suffers from the absence of 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Contrary to the image of the success of the 
EU as a global economic power, the absence of a CFSP has inhibited the evolution of the EU 
as an international actor.  
 
Despite this weakness, the EU still carries substantial political weight as a ‘soft power’, 
determining political change through economic incentives. Its volume of trade, investment, 
financial flows and regional trade agreements are testament to its prominence. The EU has 
used its competitive advantage to bring change by imposing conditions as well as economic 
incentives -- including terms of entry into bilateral and multilateral agreements, and accession 
to the EU itself.  
 
The EU and Latin America 
 
The political principles behind the EU’s relations with Latin America are outlined in Article 
177 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The Treaty 
makes clear that ‘human development and civil society [should be] at the heart of the 
relationship between the two regions.’ As a result, relations between the two continents reflect 
three priorities: first, the promotion and protection of human rights, second, the promotion of 
the information society, and third, the reduction of social imbalances through a global 
approach to poverty.  
 
Overall, we are witnessing the emergence of the EU as a global force. Policy towards Latin 
America has mirrored the EU’s development as a political and economic agency. Just as the 
EU has sought to reflect the diversity of areas of regional cooperation such as ASEAN, so 
EU-Latin American relations have reflected the diverse needs and opportunities of the 
Americas.  
 
The EU’s strategy reflects a shift away from traditional policy, towards policies that 
encompass general EU concerns with poverty, democracy and the rule of law. A decisive 
factor in forging a greater role for Latin America in EU foreign policy has been the decision 
of the US to take a more assertive role in Latin America. NAFTA has indeed prompted the 
EU to consider other ‘strategic inter -regional partnerships’ 5However, driven by its 
comparative advantage, this strategy is economic, rather than political. It is replicating its 
internal success internationally, and increasingly flexing its muscle by extending its economic 
reach via inter -regional cooperation. According to Mark Leonard, ‘the EU’s success has let 
the genie of regionalism out of the bottle, and it will be impossible to put it back again. This 
new regionalism is not about autarchic blocs at war with one another: it is about clubs that 
promote global development, regional security and open markets for their members’.6 
 
In Latin America, the EU is determined to forge wider and deeper relations with the region as 
part of its broader goal for a greater international presence. Inter-regional partnerships are a 
de facto collective strategy, as they allow the EU to pursue political goals, such as good 
governance, human rights and democracy, through economic means. The policies and 
principles underlining EU strategies of bilateral agreements and region forming are thus 
directly at odds to the present model of the FTAA.  
 
                                              
5 European Commission, Directorate-General for External Relations, European Union Relations with 
the United States (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002). 
6 Leonard, M. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London: Fourth Estate, 2005). 
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THE ORIGINS OF THE FTAA 
 
The inspiration for the FTAA came in 1990, with the establishment of the ‘Enterprise for the 
Americas’ initiative by President George Bush. During the 1990s, discussion of the FTAA ran 
parallel to the formation of NAFTA in 1994. The motivation for the US to proceed with the 
FTAA was the opportunity to establish wider economic re-engagement with the hemisphere 
as a whole. In 1994, and with the first Summit of the Americas in Miami, the FTAA began to 
take shape.  
 
The countries that had most to gain and who were most interested in promoting the FTAA 
were either those who felt most excluded from the international markets - Central America, 
Andean Community (CAN)7 (excluding Venezuela) -- and countries that could maximize the 
benefits of an institutionalised free trade area – particularly Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.   
 
The FTAA was expected to be the most comprehensive trade and investment regime in the 
world. It was designed to be an aggressive expansion of NAFTA, and include universal 
coverage for all productive and service sectors, and fixed rules at all levels of government.   
 
For the US, the FTAA represented a chance to consolidate its economic interests in the 
region, and to push forward an economic model which, in time, it was hoped would become a 
model for FTAs endorsed by the WTO. 
  
Opportunities and Threats  
 
Formal negotiations began in 1994, when 34 leaders of the Western Hemisphere (except 
Cuba) agreed to the creation of a basic structure to enable their governments to conduct 
formal negotiations. The objective was a deal that would by 2005 progressively eliminate 
barriers to trade and investment among the participating countries.  
 
The mission was nothing less than to establish rules for business to trade freely throughout 
the region. Although based on the model of NAFTA, the FTAA went far beyond NAFTA in 
its scope and power.  It covers many countries and all industries (from agriculture to health 
care), and both public and private sectors. In function, it introduces into the Western 
Hemisphere all the disciplines of the services agreement of the WTO and GATS (General 
Agreement on Trade in Services), and thereby creates a trading powerhouse.  
 
In practice, under the WTO, countries focus upon industries that have a competitive 
advantage, specialising in what is most economical, exporting products and using foreign 
exchange to purchase other goods for local consumption. This process depends on 
participating countries not competing with subsidised markets - particularly in agriculture, 
where the US has protected large agri-business.  
 
However both experience and analysis su ggest that economies of scale will ensure that the 
larger countries will fare better – and that countries will profit from their in-built advantages. 
This could have serious implications for the smaller Latin American economies where, as 
NAFTA has demonstrated, exports and overall productivity have increased income – but 
equalities between regions and within countries have not disappeared.  
 
Opponents of the FTAA have argued that, without accommodation for asymmetries, the 
prospect that economic integration will lead to economic convergence is unrealistic. Without 
protection for small economies, and without the transfer of technology, education and 
infrastructure from large economies to smaller ones, there is no means to ‘level the playing 
field’ and inequalities will grow.   
                                              
7 CAN comprises Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.  
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Negotiations and Current Status  
 
For many reasons, negotiations over the FTAA have been protracted and difficult. For 
example, the Venezuelan government has  ‘decided’ that it would take no further part in the 
negotiations and suggested its own strategy instead – the ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana 
para America Latina y el Caribe) – which attempts to promote economic and social 
development via controlled regional economic integration. 8  
 
In addition, there is a strong current, led by Brazil, that a SAFTA (South American Free 
Trade Agreement) would be more appropriate, given the detrimental effects NAFTA has had 
on Brazil’s manufacturing and agricultural trade to Mexico. Brazil (together with Argentina 
and Venezuela) has, in fact, urged the formation of SAFTA, and has been a key agent in 
driving through the formation of the South American Community of Nations (SACN), which 
was formed on 8 th December 2004 in Cusco, Peru.9 The new trading bloc is to unite 
MERCOSUR and the CAN with Chile, Guyana, and Suriname in one large trading bloc. 
 
According to Isaac Bigio, ‘South America has two options. One is to proceed totally behind 
the North American economic engine, and the other is to maintain good relations with the 
United States, while seeking to explore connections with new emerging powers.’ 10 As part of 
a wider strategy, the SACN fulfils the Brazilian determination to build bargaining power in 
negotiations with the US, thereby appeasing regional and domestic interests.  
 
It was always acknowledged that negotiating the FTAA and meeting the ambitions as well as 
the fears of competing economic and social groups would be extremely difficult. In effect, 
opposition has come from two sources, representing two competing points of view. On the 
one hand, there is the civil lobby that argues that the Agreement, by subscribing solely to an 
economic model, will have a damaging social and economic effect on the most vulnerable. 
The opposing lobby, the corporate interest, led by the Brazil has obstructed the agreement, 
complain that the terms of trade are neither fair nor free.  One of the most important issues for 
Brazil is access to US markets in orange juice, soybeans, and beef. The US currently has high 
tariffs on all three products. These industries are well represented in the nine trade negotiating 
committees of the FTAA, and the US is reluctant to constrain them because of domestic 
political considerations. 
 
In addition, if created, the public and political power of the FTAA will be extremely wide. 
The conditions will apply to all laws and regulatory acts of all governments, and will apply to 
measures taken by non-governmental institutions at all levels. While governments have the 
right to regulate services, they will be able to do so only in ways that are compatible with the 
rules created by the FTAA. 
 
Negotiations for the FTAA have continued regularly for the last ten years. During three 
Ministerial meetings – in Quebec City in April 2000, Buenos Aires in April 2001, and in 
Quito, in October 2002 — negotiators have tried to work out differences in draft texts. But the 
differences have widened. As more progressive governments have been elected in Venezuela, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay – there has been less rather than greater willingness to 
negotiate their countries' futures under the current FTAA. At the Ministerial meeting in 
                                              
 
8 Interview with Hernan Escobar, Political Attaché, Venezuelan Embassy, Brussels, 15 April 2005. 
9 SACN is the result of ten years of negotiation that brought together the two South American 
subregional integration blocs MERCOSUR and CAN. 
10 Turck, Mary, South American Community of Nations (Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones — 
CSN): http://www.americas.org 
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Miami in November 2003, for example, negotiators vastly scaled back the scope of the 
proposed FTAA because of these growing divergences.  
 
In Puebla, Mexico in February 2004 and later in Buenos Aires, in April 2004 the negotiations 
faltered. The main obstacle has been not the smaller countries with their small overall 
influence, but, predictably, Brazil which has traditionally flexed its muscles by virtue of its 
powerful economy.  Brazil has refused to sign the Agreement, alleging that it contradicts the 
notion of free trade. Specifically, Brazil has complained that the US has refused to give way 
on agricultural and steel subsidies and intellectual property. In response, the US has proposed 
the ‘FTAA-lite’, by which each country can cherry pick the agreement for itself. However, 
despite the fact that Brazil subsidises its industries within MERCOSUR, when dealing with 
the FTAA, it favoured a WTO–plus, a no-holds-barred approach. As they currently stand, 
FTAs designed by and suited to the US have not met Brazilian approval, and have brought the 
FTAA to a stalemate.    
 
The deadline for signing the deal of 1 January 2005 passed without agreement. As of October 
2005, negotiations remain suspended.  
 
While Latin American countries consider their position, the Bush Administration is allegedly 
using ‘divide-and-conquer’ tactics to negotiate. This means, in effect, the use of bilateral, and 
regional agreements to pressurise Brazil into reducing its conditions. The Central American 
Free Trade Agreement essentially provides further evidence of the US’s desire to expand 
NAFTA on a regional scale. 
 
Evidence of these tactics emerged in November 2004, when the US announced the beginning 
of negotiations with Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia for an Andean Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA) - a clear attempt to break Andean unity with Venezuela.  
 
The question now is whether the concept of FTAA will survive these attacks – and whether it 
can be salvaged, and under what terms? Is there time, or the political will for a renegotiation 
which will give way before the realities of a new regionalism, and give equal weight to civil 
and social needs?  
 
CONCERN, CONFLICT AND FAILURE 
 
There are two main arguments against the FTAA as it presently stands. First, there are those 
who object in principle to free trade as a policy objective, on the grounds that it disadvantages 
poor economies and poor people. This lobby, made up largely of people outside the process, 
is neither organi sed, focussed or effective.  
 
Second, there are those who object to the FTAA in terms of flaws in the model, the evidence 
of disadvantage already seen in NAFTA, and the exclusive and narrowly defined nature of the 
interests represented by the process.  They condemn the FTAA as doomed to failure because 
of the model on which it is based, and because of the flaws that the FTAA seem doomed to 
reproduce -- and that are likely to set sovereignty and autonomy in unfair competition against 
market interests. This group has taken issue with the process itself, which has excluded the 
voices of those who are most affected, and in particular, those who represent civil society.  
Such lobbies, including the Hemispheric Social Alliance, have highlighted the contradiction 
between the rhetoric that token representation is somehow equal to influence, and the reality 
of the process. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
ARGUMENTS IN PRINCIPLE 
 
One of the most principled and powerful arguments against the Agreement is the fundamental 
claim that RTAs or FTAs can never benefit weaker or poorer countries, because they offer 
unfair odds. This section examines these arguments, as background to reviewing arguments 
against the FTAA in general. 
 
Levelling the field 
 
A central political and economic argument against the FTAA is that, like NAFTA, it is built 
on asymmetries that reinforce inequalities in power and opportunity. The most conspicuous 
inequality is that the US has a GDP equal to 75 percent of the total goods and services of the 
hemisphere. Yet, the FTAA would establish a system under which poor countries and wealthy 
countries alike are held to the same standards.  
 
It is also argued that the FTAA will exacerbate inequalities in relation to investment.  If 
NAFTA is any indication, the FTAA has the potential to hamper, and not provide, for real 
sustainable and equitable development unless GDP grows and wealth can be redistributed. 
However, there is neither the means nor the structure for this to occur if the same economic 
prescriptions continue.  
 
On the larger canvass, opponents of the FTAA see it as another manifestation of the perils of 
globalisation, in which the benefits of trade liberalisation are determined by the global 
market, country specific conditions, and economic policies. An ‘un-level’ playing field 
reinforces asymmetries between exports and growth that can create distortions for developing 
countries. Its opponents say that the FTAA will lock in place legal structures that enforce the 
negative consequences of structural programs.  
 
The answer to persistent inequalities, it is argued, and the way to address the disadvantages 
developing countries face, is to enable them to invest in industrial innovation, which includes 
transfers of technology, production, and new processes. In addition, they would be able to 
strengthen ties between production and export sectors and encourage diversification. 
Flexibility within domestic markets and a degree of protectionism become important. The 
FTAA, however, denies both.  
 
Among those who support the FTAs, and specifically the FTAA, there is a view that 
asymmetrical trade relations can act as incentives to development. This argues that a relative 
comparative advantage of one country over another will lead to trade and FDI, which will 
lead to gains for the weaker side – this has become the ‘rising tide lifts all boats’ model.  Its 
efficacy has yet to be tested. 
 
In summary, those who argue against the FTAA argue that it will increase disadvantages, 
distort the economy, and prevent diversification. Predominately negotiated behind closed 
doors, with unbalanced input from civil society and corporations, the FTAA is an example of 
free-market fundamentalism, driven by corporate interest. Protest has taken the form of broad 
groups, from environmentalists to defenders of women’s rights – all of whom see 
globalisation as the enemy. By raising awareness of the potential detrimental effects of the 
FTAA, protestors from the Pampas to Portland have challenged FTAA negotiators to abandon 
their quest for free trade in exchange for fair trade in their region.  
 
Opposition to the FTAA: A model built on failure  
 
Currently, opposition to the FTAA has intensified.  Opponents have argued that it will 
exacerbate on a regional scale the negative externalities suffered following the introduction of 
NAFTA, which gave the rules for FTAA negotiations.  It does seem the case that, despite the 
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widely held view that strong institutions and good governance -- and by implication, strong 
democracy-- are conducive to economic growth, FTAA negotiators have ignored the potential 
detrimental effects that the agreement will have on democratic governance, the rule of law, 
and state capacity to promote equitable development.  At the heart of these concerns is the 
fact that, if unchallenged, the FTAA will reproduce Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement as 
the core of the FTAA’s agreement. That this is likely to be the case is seen in the most recent 
draft of the FTAA, made public after the 2002 Quito ministerial meeting.   
 
Under Chapter 11, investors obtain in-built protection that can work against the public 
interest. Through the investor-state dispute mechanism (ISDM), where states are pitched 
against companies, a private investor in one signatory state may claim that another state has 
violated legal obligations it has to him. In detail, investors are entitled to compensation for 
government measures that:   
 
· Accord foreign investors less favourable treatment than domestic investors (national 
treatment standard, (Article 1102);   
· Accord foreign investors of one state less favourable treatment than foreign investors 
of other states (the most favoured nation standard Article 1103);   
· fail to afford investors minimum standards of fair and equable treatment and full 
protection and security as defined by international law (minimum international 
standards, (Article 1105 ) 
· Impose certain enumerated performance requirements on foreign investment (Article 
1106) 
· Expropriate the investment whether ‘directly or indirectly or by any measure 
tantamount to expropriation (Article 1110)11 
 
Overall, it is argued, the effect of Chapter 11 has been ‘to challenge democracy, sovereignty, 
the rule of law, regulatory practices and administrative effectiveness’.12  In a wide range of 
examples across the NAFTA region, corporations have been able to appeal and challenge 
decisions made on environmental and other grounds that have infringed on labour rights.  
 
The case of the Ethyl Corporation versus Canada is perhaps the clearest example of how 
NAFTA has limited the three government’s ability to regulate or control corporations —in 
this case, to the detriment of public health. Canada prohibited the importation of Ethyl’s 
gasoline additive called MMT -- on the grounds that it was a health and environmental 
hazard. The Ethyl Corporation responded that this was unfair under the terms of NAFTA, and 
Canada lost the case in the NAFTA tribunal. Rather than pay the penalty of US$ 250 million, 
Canada decided to settle, paying the Ethyl Corporation US$13 million, removing the ban on 
MMT, and giving a public apology to Ethyl Corporation. Canada lost because its 
‘precautionary principle’ was not solid enough, implying that there has to be active and 
                                              
11 In addition, under the ISDM tribunal, there is no independent panel of judges and no system of 
review. Each ISDM tribunal consists of a body of three arbitrators chosen ad hoc, one selected by each 
of the two sides in disagreement, and the third selected following agreement between the two (Article 
1123). Since a majority of two is enough to make a decision, it is possible that a result can be reached 
solely by arbitrators whom the private investor has chosen. Arbitrators are not obliged to follow earlier 
NATFA decision (Article 1136) and are normally international lawyers financed by disputing parties. 
Public acces s to oral hearings of the arbitration systems is note permitted, and the decision whether to 
divulge documents is left to tribunal to decide. The public can be effectively banned from learning 
about NAFTA proceedings. Barenberg, M and Evans, P, ‘The FTAA’s Impact on Democratic 
Governance’ in Estevadeordal A, Rodrik, D, Taylor, A and Velasco A, (eds.), Integrating the 
Americas: FTAA and Beyond  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 780-781.  
12 Ibid, pg, 791. 
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proved environmental and human damage before a product can be removed. Canada’s defeat 
in this case contributed directly to its later retraction of tough cigarette packaging regulations. 
 
In effect, evidence suggests that the tribunals are giving greater protection to investors than 
investors enjoy under domestic laws. The tribunals have also enlarged the definition of 
property against expropriation, and have diminished the degree of regulation necessary to 
require compensation of affected property holders.  
 
The fundamental criticism of Chapter 11, however, is that NAFTA has reinforced 
inequalities. Opponents suggest that the FTAA will be socially, economically and 
environmentally detrimental. First, poverty will increase as wages will be lowered, in order 
for industries to be competitive. Second, workers’ rights will be forgotten, as these would 
imply conditions that might put off investors, and third, that environmental standards will be 
disregarded, lest they be another disincentive to investors.13 Moreover, in a clear indication of 
its lack of concern towards social and environmental issues, the FTAA’s ‘social’ regulations, 
which are similar to those later incorporated into NAFTA, and which allow for private 
arbitrator panels in labour relations matters, are not binding. To date, the NAFTA commission 
dealing with labour issues (NAALC) has not exercised its discretion to move any inquiry 
beyond the consultative phase, and there has been neither expert report nor arbitration.14 
 
Proponents of NAFTA, however, highlight the massive growth that has occurred in trade 
among the US, Mexico and Canada. From 1994 to 2000 foreign investment grew 128% and 
total exports reached US$621 billion. Canadian exports to Mexico and the US grew from 
US$117 billion to US$229 billion, and Mexico’s exports to the US and Canada reached 
US$139 billion, representing a 225% increase. From 1993, US exports to Canada and Mexico 
grew from US$142 billion in 1992 to US$265 billion in 2001.15  
 
The evidence suggests, however, that while trade grew, growth has been uneven. NAFTA 
rules allow companies to pit worker against worker and to drive down wages and working 
conditions, and companies use the threat of leaving to break unions and get concessions at the 
bargaining table. There is little evidence that NAFTA has created a balanced healthy 
economy in Mexico, with the losers outnumbering the winners. Indeed, as a result of its large 
external debt and inability to control speculation, Mexico devalued its currency in 1994/1995 
and is still recovering. Wages are lower than they were before NAFTA; poverty levels are 
higher; more jobs in the agricultural sector have been lost than created; and income 
inequalities have increased. Regional and economic disparities have persisted, and rather than 
producing ‘more and better jobs’ to keep workers at home, NAFTA has failed to stem 
                                              
13 Coote, B, NAFTA: Poverty and Free Trade in Mexico (London: Oxfam Publications, 1995); 
Echeverri-Carroll, E, (ed.), NAFTA and Trade Liberalization in the Americas (Austin: Bureau of 
Business Research, Graduate School of Business, IC2 Institute, University of Texas at Austin, 1995). 
14 The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation were incorporated into NAFTA following US 
Congressional pressure.  NAALC requires each NAFTA country to enforce its domestic laws but does 
not impose supranational labour rights. However, NAALC does allow for worker representatives to 
request the NAALC commission to investigate if a NAFTA country has failed to enforce its domestic 
laws. The commission can decide to take the investigation further through the following phases -- 
consultation among the three ministries of labour, a report by a committee of experts, and arbitration 
by members of tribunals chosen by the NAFTA states. Barenberg, M and Evans, P, ‘The FTAA’s 
Impact on Democratic Governance’ in Estevadeordal A, Rodrik, D, Taylor, A and Velasco A (eds.), 
Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pg, 
770 
15 San Sebastian, M and Hurtig, A, ‘Moving on from NAFTA to the FTAA?: The Impact of Trade 
Agreements on Social and Public Health Conditions in the Americas’, in Revista Pan Americana de 
Salud Publica/Pan America Public Heath Review, 16 (4), (2004), 273. 
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migration to the US or to boost Mexico’s export-agricultural industry. Moreover, as Mexico 
heads towards ‘NAFTA-parity’, regional economic divergences are widening.  
 
ARGUMENTS IN PRACTICE 
 
The Failure of the Process  
 
Against the history of NAFTA, much of the opposition to the FTAA has focused on the 
process itself, and what it represents --and more particularly, excludes. Despite repeated calls 
for the open and democratic development of trade policy, opponents believe that the FTAA 
negotiations have been conducted without sufficient input from civil society. As Barenberg 
and Evans observe, “US corporate and financial elites have played an undemocratically 
disproportionate and non-transparent role in the crafting and ongoing defence of the 
prospective FTAA’s exceptionally broad investor protections.”16 
 
From the beginning of the process at the Miami Summit in 1994, a variety of groups made 
strenuous attempts to gain access to the negotiations, but all were rejected. In addition, when 
the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society was 
finally created in 1998, three years after ministerial meetings had begun, participation was 
limited to a suggestions box. This was largely perceived as a ‘slap in the face’. Engagement 
has been seen as begrudging rather than enthusiastic. The first meeting between ministers and 
the public in Quito was seen as more symbolic than substantive.     
 
Evidence that the FTAA was entirely a trade-led process was highlighted by the fact that, 
since December 1994, of the eight ministerial positions within the US negotiating team - the 
main driving force behind the Agreement - more than two thirds come from the office of the 
USTR (US Trade Representative). Moreover, there has been no participation by elected 
representatives or appointed officials whose mandate encompasses broader issues of 
democratic government.  
 
An Alternative for the Americas? 
 
Opponents of the FTAA have put forward alternative agendas. For example, the Hemispheric 
Social Alliance has presented proposals for an ‘Alternative for the Americas’, which prioritise 
workers over corporations and capital.17 Groups opposed to the FTAA feel dismayed because 
early pledges were made that negotiations would reflect both private and public sectors. The 
first open invitation in San Jose in 1998 was followed by an FTAA ministerial meeting in 
Toronto in 1999, which requested the Committee of Government Representatives on the 
Participation of Civil Society to ‘obtain ongoing input from civil society on trade matters 
relevant to the FTAA.’ However, the dialogue has not taken place.  
 
Following the first meeting in October 1998, Oxfam stated that “this meeting cannot be 
considered consultation because it does not meet the necessary conditions for it to claim that 
civil society is participating fully in the process. The process has been more of a matter of 
formality than a real exchange and consultation.”18  
 
Similarly, although a process has been set up to solicit citizens' views, there is no mechanism 
to incorporate public concerns into the actual negotiations. Indeed, critics complain that the 
                                              
16 Barenberg, M. and Evans, P., ‘The FTAAs Impact on Democratic Governance’, in Estevadeordal A, 
Rodrik, D. Taylor, A and Velasco, A (eds.), Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pg 778 
17 ‘Hemispheric Social Alliance, Alternative for the Americas 2002’, http://www.art-us.org 
18 Oxfam’s testimonial to the committee of government representatives on the participation of civil 
society 1998: http: //www.alca-ftaa.org./spcomm/soc/thm _ meet/cstmi8_asp 
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demands of industry have been accepted at the cost of civil society, and that industry has 
written the rules. Certainly, under the so-called ‘trade advisory committee system,’ more than 
500 corporate representatives have the security clearance to get advance access to FTAA 
negotiating texts. This opportunity is not open to civil society groups. The Business Forum 
for the Americas has met in close liaison with negotiators, whereas the public has been 
reduced to offering proposals without being invited to discuss them.   
 
The outcome of this unbalanced process is that the social agenda has been driven to the 
margins, exacerbating fears that the FTAA in its present form will serve only big business, 
and that small producers, farmers, workers and families will be left at the mercy of the 
market. Given the failure to engage fully with the social agenda, it is therefore unsurprising 
that many interests in North and Latin America remain sceptical, if not actively opposed to 
the FTAA.  
 
The failure to resolve these matters so far, presents an opportunity to return to negotiations to 
ensure that a more balanced reflection of both economic and societal needs are included in the 
Agreement.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite multilateral liberalisation, there remains little doubt that bilateral and regional trade 
agreements will remain on the international agenda. However, given the difficulties over the 
FTAA, the failure of the NAFTA model, and the nature of the opposition, it may be that 
FTAs/RTAs are entering an age when ‘new regionalism’ and a more democratic agenda may 
be taking shape.   
 
As long as regionalism is seen mainly in terms of the mercantilist interests of the leading 
parties, then its beneficial impact on development will remain limited. In particular, as we are 
inclined to agree, “bilateral individual RTAs between a rich and poor country can lead to a 
situation where the initial income imbalances and divisions of labour will be permanently 
‘crystallised’ along a North-South divide.”19  
 
To work for investors, producers and consumers in a proper, sustainable partnership, North-
South agreements must balance between the tenets of sustainable development: stable growth, 
and social progress, including core labour standards and environmental protection. As 
Kimberly Ann Elliot has observed, “global labour standards are not only politically necessary 
but also substantially complementary to economic integration in the hemisphere.”20 Although 
the EU is championing these issues in the Doha Development Agenda, it has yet to promote 
them through RTAs already in force or under negotiation.  
 
The evidence suggests that, under the current model, the US and the big producers are not 
interested in producing a benevolent model; they support FTAs that will serve their own 
interests.  But even for the US, to build a free trade area based on low wages, low skills and 
profits, in a fast shifting global market, is short -term thinking. Supporting sustainable 
development is surely the better long-term option, both in terms of investment and in view of 
increasing competition from the rest of the world.  
 
                                              
19 Defraigne, P, Deputy Director General DG Trade, European Commission, New Regionalism and 
Global Economic Governance, in UNU/CRIS e-Working papers, Bruges, 2002.  
 
20 Elliot, K, 'Labour Standards in the FTAA' in Estevadeordal A, Rodrik, D, Taylor, A and Velasco A, 
(eds), Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond , (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004), pg 
251-254 
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Some in Latin America have called for is a type of FTA with a ‘Marshall Plan’, where the US 
and other regional leaders focus on long-term economic and political gains.  
As long as the FTAA fails to recognise and negotiate a sustainable agenda, it is unlikely to 
help economies and communities make for real growth and fair markets. Failure to invest in 
human capital, in transfers of knowledge and technology, and in the encouragement of 
innovation and development, limits the growth of North as well as South, and will limit Latin 
America to being a large warehouse for raw materials and manufactured goods.  
 
The race for competitiveness has, according to critics of the FTAA, produced a ‘race to the 
bottom.’ Globalisation has forced developing countries into a situation they cannot win. 
Either they join regional blocs in order to compete on a regional as well as an international 
level, or else they become economically excluded from the international market. However, 
the consequences of integration can be negative, as poor countries try to compete for 
investment with other poor countries by offering potential investors favourable economic 
conditions at the price of workers’ rights and the environment. Therefore, in order to prevent 
a ‘race to the bottom’, policy-makers must change the rules of engagement and the basis of 
global competition. To sustain and promote growing employment and better working 
conditions, those who are negoti ating the FTAA must include enforceable workers’ rights 
principles in its foundations. These core principles include freedom of association, the right to 
organise and bargain collectively, a minimum age for the employment of children, and 
prohibitions on forced labour and employment discrimination. Commitment to observing 
these core principles should be a condition for entry into the FTAA, and appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms should be established. 
 
While failure to do this so far is particularly acute in relation to the FTAA, it reflects on the 
model of globalisation itself -- which reinforces asymmetries, and which does not encourage 
convergence within a realistic timescale, let alone cost effective policies such as debt 
repayment. Ignoring the inescapable link between trade and social and environmental 
consequences will continue to alienate public support. It is only by including these larger 
factors in the debate that nations will achieve sustainable development based on legitimate 
competition. It is not simply a question of encouraging more active participation; it is also an 
issue of credible participation, to ensure that appeal and dispute mechanisms are fair, robust 
and honoured. For too long, negotiators have entered FTAs on the basis of a win-lose game 
with the interests of trade set against those of social and environmental protection.  But, just 
as social responsibility in industry, ethical investment and community development have 
come to be seen as elements of successful business practice, so must these principles be 
integrated into international affairs as well.    
 
This is where the EU can provide a particularly powerful role model. In supporting a trade 
agenda, environmental and social standards have been identified as promoting economic 
objectives. This strategy for development and competitiveness is contrary to the FTAA where 
the sole motivating factor is short term economic gain, and in which integration is only a 
means to bring markets rather than societies together. 
 
The idea of the ‘new regionalism’, with its optimistic overtones for democracy, offers a 
potential solution for the Americas. The fundamental challenge of the ‘new regionalism’, as it 
has been defined, is to combine participation with influence; to move beyond token presence 
to inform decision. But the failure of the FTAA, squeezed between rival world-views, shows 
how far away from power those who seek to influence governance, improve democracy and 
promote citizenship actually are. As the matter stands, by repeating the mistakes of the past 
and fuelling the ‘race to the bottom’, the FTAA is missing an opportunity to establish a 
benevolent and successful economic agreement that respects and accommodates social and 
environmental imperatives.  
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It is too early to say whether the FTAA can or will be rescued, or whether Chapter 11 will be 
removed from the final plan; or indeed, whether civil society groups or countries with vested 
interests -- such as Brazil -- will prevail in the final form. What is undoubted, is that the 
negotiations for a FTA of the Americas, which were once conducted behind closed doors, 
have now been flung wide open to international criticism. The entire process is now open to 
public debate. We can only hope that this will encourage successful business practice and 
good government for the benefit of the whole community.   
 
As Tunku Abdul Aziz told the International Institute of Finance in Kuala Lumpur three years 
ago: 
 
The bottom line is simply that no change or improvement in the way we manage our 
business operations can be sustained if our attitude to good governance is out of kilter 
with contemporary global trends…Business in not just about making sound 
investment decisions, taking and managing risks, and dealing with economic 
uncertainties. Today, it is about social responsibility, putting all of our actions under 
public scrutiny, and responding to the concerns of those among whom we conduct 
our business in open and accountable way. It is important for all of us to remember 
that good governance, like personal integrity, is no longer the luxury of the virtuous; 
it has become a global business necessity. 21 
 
What was true in 2002 is no less true today.    
 
 
 
 
                                              
21 Speech by Transparency International Vice -Chairman Tunku Abdul Aziz at the Fourth Meeting of 
the Asian Programme of the International Institute of Finance, Kuala Lumpur, 10-11 June  2002, 
http://www.transparency.org/speeches/meeting_asia_programme.html 
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